【Speaker】Matthieu Crozet, Professor of Economics, University Paris I

【Topic】The Discriminatory Effect of Domestic Regulations on International Trade in Services: Evidence from Firm-Level Data

【Time】 Friday, April 25, 15:30-17:00

【Venue】Room 407, Weilun Building, Tsinghua SEM.

【Language】English

【Organizer】Center of International Economic Research

【Target Audience】Faculty Members and Graduate Students

【Background Information】 

Matthieu Crozet is Professor of Economics at University Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne, a Junior Member of the Institut Universitaire de France and associate professor at Paris School of Economics. He is also a scientific advisor for CEPII. Professor Crozet previously taught at University of Reims and University Paris I, and was a World Bank consultant for the project “Competitiveness assessment of West Romania”. He received his Ph.D. and Master 2 degree from University Paris I, his DEUG MASS and Master 1 from University Paris IX Daphine.

His research interest is international trade, economic geography and FDI. He has studied wholesalers in international trade, quality sorting and trade, and structural gravity equations with intensive and extensive margins. 

His work has been published in academic journals including European Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Economie et Statistique, Canadian Journal of Economics, Revue Economique and Revue d’Economie Politique, Journal of International Economics, Journal of Economic Geography, Journal of Comparative Economics, Regional Science and Urban Economics and World Economy. His research has been awarded with external financing from competitive research grants on several occasions.

【Abstract】

In order to promote international trade in services, the WTO-GATS aims at progressively eliminating discriminatory regulations, which apply to foreign suppliers, by guaranteeing equal national treatment. This paper looks instead at the trade effect of domestic regulations, which apply to all firms indifferently and do not intend to exclude foreign suppliers. We propose a theory-based empirical test to determine whether or not these domestic regulations affect foreign suppliers more than local ones. We take this test to the data by using French firm-level exports of professional services to OECD countries. Our econometric results show that domestic regulations in the importing markets matter significantly for trade in services. They reduce both the decision to export and the individual exports. These results tend to prove that domestic regulations are de facto discriminatory even if they are not de jure.