【Abstract】This paper addresses the strategic interactions in a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer who sells a new-to-be-released product to a retailer under a wholesale price contract, who in turn sells to forward looking consumers. The retailer having advance selling (AS) capability can decide whether to sell early to consumers through pre-orders. The existing AS literature has shown that AS creates consumer valuation uncertainty, which alone can significantly increase the retailer's profitability. Considering that AS benefits may pass to the manufacturer, it seems intuitive that AS could be a win-win strategy for supply chain players. However, we find that in equilibrium, consumer valuation uncertainty has an indirect effect that can increase the wholesale price. That is, consumer valuation uncertainty reduces consumer heterogeneity and price elasticity of demand, which may lead to an increased wholesale price and thus decrease the retailer's profit. Because of non-cooperative behavior in the supply chain, having AS capability may hurt the retailer's profit, the supply chain profit, consumer welfare, and social welfare. The manufacturer and retailer can end up in a prisoner's dilemma where the retailer does not pursue AS capability or commit to not sell in advance even if he has AS capability.