This paper examines the investments and performance of enterprises that are funded by government-sponsored venture capitalists (GVCs) and/or private venture capitalists (PVCs). Using a large international data set, we find that enterprises funded by a mixture of GVCs and PVCs obtain more investment than enterprises funded purely by PVCs, which in turn obtain more investment than those funded purely by GVCs. There is a positive association between mixed GVC/PVC funding and successful exits, as measured by IPOs and acquisitions. The main channel for the exit effects appears to be through the total amount of investment. We also find that markets with more GVC funding have more total funding and, strikingly, even have more PVC funding, even after correcting for possible endogeneity. The evidence suggests that GVC funding can have effects on both the intensive margin (more funding per enterprise) and the extensive margin (more enterprises funded). The strength of these effects differs across countries. The performance of GVCs also depends on whether they are fully owned by government or supported by governments in other ways.